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1. Introduction 
For a long period of time, the concept of trust has not been explic-
itly analysed by sociologists, or has only been analysed sporadi-
cally as part of the social relationship topic. 
Research concerning trust suffered a strong setback when the fo-
cus of studies was directed towards a rational choice in the pur-
suit of interest. 
Classic sociology has not offered a significant contribution to 
the topic. Conversely, in the past decades the topic of trust has 
been analysed in depth and not only with a focus on trust in insti-
tutions. There is thus a heated debate between the topic and mod-
ern society and its reflective ability (Beck, Giddens, Lash, 1994), 
risk society (Beck, 2013), and globalization (Giddens, 1994, 85). 
Another important branch of studies concerning trust involves 
cooperation, intended as a pre-condition for development or a 
product of developed societies. 
In the following pages, I shall elucidate some of the charac-
teristics of trust related to well-being, but I will also linger on the 
concept of mistrust in complex societies, meant as a critical basis 
for change. 
 
2. Trust-Mistrust 
Studies intertwining research on the individual and on the com-
munity place trust as a central topic (Seligman, 1999). This also 
occurs in studies strictly related to the political context. 
The concept of well-being is influenced by very specific so-
cial indicators, which refer to that which was called ‘the good life’ 
– in an ontological sense – in classic philosophy. Tangible social 
relationships – which are instead central in contemporary sociol-
ogy, especially in terms of trust-mistrust dialectics and the con-
struction of the concept of identity itself – are instead completely 
absent or considered very marginally. A’s identity is the relation-
ship between A and someone different than A. 
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The concept of trust is central to the state of well-being, 
whether it is meant from a personal perspective, a system per-
spective, or an interpersonal perspective, thus at a micro-social or 
macro-social level. The topic of trust – which ties into that of so-
cial capital as well (Bourdieu, 1980) – presents numerous issues, 
both in terms of semantic values of the concept and in terms of the 
possibility or method of measurement. Such concept also gives 
rise to a number of theoretical, practical, and methodological 
questions. 
The intention of this paper is to analyse, in particular, the 
socio-political and macroeconomic repercussions. As far as poli-
tics goes, we live in an age of mistrust: mistrust in the establish-
ment, in the judgement of experts, in scientific knowledge, in ad-
ministrators, and in democratic institutions. We thus face, as citi-
zens, a deep ‘affection’ crisis, which paves the way for populist 
forces. While trust is traditionally considered a positive element 
of social cohesion and community life, one might also interpret 
mistrust in governors as a precondition for democratic control or 
a completion of democracy: a counter-democracy (Rosanvallon, 
2006) that irrupts as a balancing force for contemporary democ-
racies. 
The need to investigate on the topic of trust is enrooted in 
the deep crisis and erosion of the social foundations of coopera-
tion and civil life, along with a major identity crisis experienced by 
Western societies. Therefore, the search of a sense or reason at 
the basis of social integration represent a strong basis for analysis 
of trust and its possible new articulations. In an atmosphere of in-
stability and uncertainty – at first in post-industrial society, and 
currently in a globalized, post-modern society – the topic of trust 
acquires new relevance (Misztal, 2013: 25). 
Surveys, ‘our daily bread’, report a general mistrust that is 
not well defined in its expressions and at times struggles to have a 
specific logic. A confidence deficit is recorded at both the macro-
social and micro-social levels (Ritter, 2013). We are living the mis-
trust heritage deriving from democratic societies, and this makes 
our path – imbued with rising, seeping, or triumphant populisms – 
arduous. On the other hand, there is the concept of trust, certified 
by an abundance of studies and analyses that have decorated it 
with the status of fundamental concept in social science, at the 
crux between psychology, anthropology, and political science. One 
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of the most fertile research currents is the one contemplating a 
synthesis of collective solidarity and individual self-fulfilment. 
It is agreed in contemporary literature concerning trust that 
the latter is important to social life and social/personal well-
being, but the concept of trust in itself is more debated. 
Certainly an initial distinction shall be made between studies re-
ferring to self-trust – self-perception imbued with trust – and sys-
tematic trust. I shall keep these two levels well separated, al-
though they certainly have a reciprocal influence on one another 
and an extremely strong correlation. 
It is a given fact that trust is the key to positive human relation-
ships and cooperation, thus life in general, thus its importance is 
also given. Nevertheless, the conditions making it come about or 
perish are less assumed. 
The contemporary sociology context boasts such a large 
number of empirical researches that we may nearly go as far as to 
say that the quantity of studies is greater than the real-life expres-
sion. There are in fact criticalities related to the concept’s polyse-
my in common use. We ask the interviewed their degree of trust 
without asking them to specify what they mean by trust, which 
causes a confusion of the system level and the personal level in 
such studies. 
As mentioned at the start of the paper, the concept of trust is 
complex and polysemic, thus we may speak of trusts in the plural 
form rather than trust in the singular form. A comparison be-
tween common use of the concept and the paradigms deriving 
from tradition gives the research an added value. 
This idea is often conceptualized, especially by Sztompka 
(Sztompka, 1999: 69 ff.), within the theoretical framework of so-
cial becoming. Society is a constant process of self-transformation, 
and this transformation changes structures, personal beliefs, and 
thus even future practices. 
The potential for action is the result of a specific fusion of 
structural conditions and the authority of human actors. As Sartre 
would put it, we may say that we are able to be, within a given set 
of conditions: I am that which I can become, we decide that which 
we are to a limited extent, but the space for freedom has a funda-
mental value. 
A well-being society avails itself of strong level of action, 
whilst a poorly developed bad-being society has a weak level of 
action. 
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The strength of an action has to do with a society’s infra-
structure and resources, some of which are tangible: capital, natu-
ral resources, the geopolitical aspect, etc. Yet there are other in-
teresting forces that are intangible: atmosphere, identity, recogni-
tion, and – very importantly – trust. 
Beck (Beck, 2013: 7-8) underlined how the importance 
which has been assigned to trust as an intangible resource of so-
cial action; he claimed that when trust fails, societies waver or 
even collapse. Gambetta – with his relevant research on the Italian 
mafia system and trust – claims that when there is total mistrust, 
cooperation between autonomous social actors will disappear. 
Such concept applies perfectly to the mafia, which tends to create 
a spiral of mistrust among citizens and mistrust towards institu-
tions in order to impose its own system. 
Even Eisenstadt and Roniger (Eisenstadt, Roniger, 1999: 
19ff.) describe trust as a necessary value and basis for the con-
struction of social relationships. This idea was reiterated by 
Luhmann who states that without any form of trust we could not 
even be able to get out of bed in the morning (Luhmann, 2002: 5). 
We may thus consider trust some sort of indispensable social 
resource favouring action as well as a self-transformation and 
well-being process within a society. 
 
3. Trust and risk 
Trust is an important resource required to think, design, and 
imagine the future, or – put more simply – to face it. 
We act in view of future events: we study in view of an exam; 
I trust I will pass it; otherwise I would not perform the action of 
studying for it.1 
To return to our initial discussion, our actions work in prediction 
of future events within the limits of given conditions: natural con-
ditions and social conditions. 
The risk we are exposed to implies an adaptation to hazard-
ous or threatening conditions. Therefore, the future of society ac-
cording to Luhmann’s idea has to do with complexity and uncer-
tainty. From this perspective, trust is an attempt to reduce com-
plexity and diminish uncertainty (Luhmann, 2002: 37): I take cer-
tain aspects of the future for granted, thus I live as if reality were 
                                                 
1 As clearly highlighted in 60 interviews to students I held at Tor Vergata University of 
Rome, the absence of trust corresponds to a lack of vision of a near future following con-
clusion of the university degree. 
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simple and safe; or in any case, by giving trust, I simplify a reality 
that, if well-known in all its aspects, would not help me, but rather 
would overtake me; besides, I do not have the power to control 
everything. 
Luhmann explains the essence of trust by means of its ability 
to generate positive effects: «Where there is trust there are in-
creased possibilities for experience and action, there is an in-
crease in the complexity of the social system and also in the num-
ber of possibilities which can be reconciled with its structure, be-
cause trust constitutes a more effective form of complexity reduc-
tion» (Luhmann, 2017: 9). Its function is to provide the feeling of 
increased understanding and reduced complexity, which is a cen-
tral issue in that the individual cannot have a sufficient level of 
knowledge to not rely upon other individuals involved in the spe-
cific fields. Since they are unable to perform certain duties or ser-
vices on their own, common people are growingly reliant upon 
experts (Beck, 2013: 20). 
Nevertheless, according to Luhmann the act of trusting is not 
based upon universalistic and general value choices – as Parsons 
claimed (Parsons, 1963:37ff) – but on answers to the social sys-
tem and environment of a selective and contingent nature. 
What are the prerequisites of trust and under what condi-
tions may they be preserved? Roniger introduced a fundamental 
distinction – also reiterated by Sztompka – between generalized 
and focalized trust. Such distinction intersected that between 
trust in institutions and interpersonal trust. Generalized trust is, 
above all, that which we think of when reflecting deeply on the 
things allowing us to act on the free market (Durkheimian precon-
tractual solidarity), as well as that which allows us to ride a bus 
without thinking it will stop in the middle of the road, Giddens 
would define this trust in expert systems. Therefore, it is a gener-
alized trust in institutions. But the fact that one doesn’t think 
someone may assault them at any moment of their life is also an 
expression of generalized trust in people, in their capacity as 
strangers. Generalized trust is anonymous; it is not directed to-
wards someone in particular or someone you know, and 
Sztompka clearly highlights how it may fail to exist or be deeply 
tarnished by the behaviour of institution representatives. 
In any case, such type of trust is the product of modern and 
complex societies. It is the result of widespread approval of de-
mocratic society and the related well-being; this is what is nor-
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mally meant when one talks about trust. When referring to pro-
fessions, Roniger spoke of focalized, category-based trust.  
Trust networks, as well as networks of friends and family 
members have well-defined limits. They normally do not extend 
beyond a certain number of network nodes and connections. 
Roniger’s intuition was that the topic of trust owes its importance 
to the fact that there is a convergence of reflections concerning 
developed countries and less developed or emerging countries. 
In the former, it is recorded that the idea of generalized trust 
is at risk – a crisis of trust in democratic systems (Warren, 1999: 
310-316) – while in the former, it is recorded that focalized risk 
with its strength and pervasiveness somehow compensates the 
inexistence of generalized trust, and at the same time contributes 
to making it impossible. Perhaps this dichotomy is not extremely 
helpful to distinguishing the systems, and sometimes the perma-
nence of friend, professional, and family networks is not necessar-
ily a remainder of the past or a lack of modernization. The true 
theoretical issue is to understand whether focalized, selective, and 
local trust systems may amalgamate and give life to generalized 
trust systems, and also how generalized trust conditions tend to 
degenerate into restricted and focalized conditions. Sztompka 
analysed Eastern European countries with a great degree of pes-
simism, but did not describe the functioning mechanism and the 
incidence of a history of focalized trust in detail. Customized trust 
relationships were very popular, especially in the economic con-
text that was subject to the bureaucracy of the single party. As for 
Italy, the most fitting example is what is defined as clientelism, 
namely the set of reciprocal favours that are more common than 
the trust we consider normal or generalized. 
Another question arises concerning the shift to generalized 
trust in Western countries. Here, we may witness episodes such as 
the rebirth of ethnic movements boasting selective trust, thus an 
intra-community trust in the members of the specific group. An-
other phenomenon features trust turning into a good on the mar-
ket; not in the financial context, but in the online context. Indeed, 
‘likes’ have a precise economic value. Trust is promoted just as a 
product. The key to development of trust and appeal is certainly 
not charisma, but something quite different. 
It is hard to predict what the effect of such promocracy will 
have on generalized trust. To trust means to accept a calculated 
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risk that implies the possibility of crosschecking, otherwise it is no 
longer trust, but faith. 
The behaviour of an individual, in the capacity as social ac-
tor, in relation to the feeling of trust towards other social actors 
and society itself – viewed in its complexity and entirety – mainly 
depends upon the answers to local issues he/she expects from in-
stitutions: trust is not a consensus of value, but a feeling that 
arises or fails to arise in response to situations strictly related to 
contingency. 
Therefore, trust has to do with the parts of future generated 
at a social level: others exist and I cannot know whether their ac-
tions might be favourable to myself or not. The more complex, 
thus modern, a society is, the more such risk increases. 
Trust is a path to reduce such complexity. If we give trust to 
someone, it means we invest on that person. Sztompka’s defini-
tion thus comes in handy: trust is a bet on the future, contingent 
actions of others (Sztompka, 2003: 18ff ). This leads us to a zoom 
in on the field of trust in human actions. In this sense, trust and 
hope belong to two conceptually different categories. Trust has to 
do with human actions, and to a certain extent we can have on in-
fluence on the latter. Just consider the amazing statement by 
Simmel, who claims that personal trust activates a social relation-
ship, and when we are given it, it shall be ‘honoured’; it implies an 
almost coercive prejudice, and to let it down requires a «positive 
meanness». Therefore, the act of trust implies the involvement not 
only of those who trust, but even those who are put trust in, who 
have the task to prove to be worthy of such trust. At times, though, 
when the act of trust is deeply disappointed, and those who 
trusted realize their trust was misplaced, the latter may brusquely 
turn into mistrust. 
Hope contains an idea of destiny and fate, while trust may be 
classified as a social action. Trust is our expectation of any result 
among the actions that others may perform: it is trust in someone 
else’s actions. Trust is thus a bet made by the social actor; he/she 
puts trust in another for the performance of an action. In short, 
trust is a person’s expectation of a certain probability that an-
other’s actions will be favourable to him/her. Oppositely, if no ac-
tive commitment is made, the action falls under a slightly vague 
category, which is not trust in the strict sense. Broadly speaking, 
confidence is a concept that is not based upon a personal action, 
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but is generic, and does not give those who trust any power or 
imply a relationship. 
There are thus a number of expressions at the various levels 
of trust: we may assign it to numerous and different social actors, 
and may assign it with different levels of generality. 
A prime example of generalized trust is trust in democracy: a 
form of trust that provides a kind of ontological safety, a confi-
dence in the continuity of our self-identity and in the social envi-
ronments of action (Giddens, 1994). 
There is a form of trust that is segmented, or addressed to a 
single sector and not to another. This may also involve institu-
tions: we may trust one institution, but not another. Another im-
portant area is technological trust: nowadays, we could not live 
without a minimum amount of trust in the technological system 
we are immersed in – though it is quite mine-laden (Beck, 2013). 
Such trust has repercussions on products as well. Moreover, posi-
tional trust depends on the role a person has and is interested in 
preserving. Trust in people is a completely different matter, and 
depends on the perceived individual competence, reliability, in-
tegrity, and generosity. 
The factor all the above subjects of trust have in common is 
an action, and the effects produced by such action. 
4. Trust and politics 
What is known as climate of trust or trust/mistrust atmosphere – 
which pervades society as a whole and is perceived at various lev-
els – is a different matter (Griffero, 2016: 11). The overall trust 
atmosphere has grave consequences. A shared trust atmosphere – 
which manifests itself in all areas of society and goes as far as 
turning into an expectation of norms – becomes an integral part of 
cultural systems. Therefore, in presence of a trust or mistrust at-
mosphere, individuals feel compelled to show a certain trust/-
mistrust in their relationships that goes beyond personal inclina-
tion. In a perceived atmosphere of trust, culture of suspicion turns 
into a struggle to speak out, due indeed to the fact the atmosphere 
exists on a level that is external to us, which we must always deal 
with. Thus the atmosphere, as a gaseous substance, stretches un-
challenged from its level to every individual, making both trust 
and mistrust contagious. Trust seems to have a top-down exten-
sion, while mistrust appears to have a bottom-up extension. In 
other words, when there is generalized trust, there is trust in in-
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stitutions and in their subsystems. The more trust there is at 
higher levels, the easier it will be to spread it. The more consent 
leaders have, the more they will be able to disseminate trust, 
while the opposite goes for mistrust. Take the moments of acute 
crisis – for example the period of the Tangentopoli scandal in It-
aly. The accuse of corruption directed towards one or even multi-
ple subjects has led to an apparently irreversible mistrust in the 
system, institutions, and everyone, and this caused the said dis-
semination: there is no right political system, there are no honest 
politicians, and politics as a whole is corrupt. It led to the destruc-
tion: the corrupt system must die and collapse. This goes to prove 
how trust is an extremely fragile good (Mutti, 1987), though ques-
tioning the sense to assign to such fragility may help overcome it. 
This was done successfully by Rosanvallon, though he ig-
nored the failures and broken promises of democracy. As Rosan-
vallon highlights, it will be the trust citizens have in political lead-
ers that will create control and the need for control, thus making 
the former more aware and participating. Once again, there is 
shift in meaning. Rosanvallon counterpoises a positive conception 
of trust to the complaints on the effects of individualism, the fall 
back on private services, and the decline of politics – with a de-
tachment of the establishment from politics: counter-democracy, 
which is a participation mode that is not the opposite, but rather a 
complement of democracy. It is through such that civil society su-
pervises and stimulates institutions: a democracy of organized 
mistrust, which contrasts that of electoral legitimacy. Counter-
democracy is thus an integral part of institutions, and by means of 
control and surveillance it expands and extends democracy. The 
erosion of trust as an invisible institution (Arrow) has given life to 
an organization of mistrust. Rosanvallon’s proposal shall be right-
fully included in the democratic approach towards mistrust, 
which finds expression in three forms: power of surveillance, 
forms of prohibition, and expression of judgement. Mistrust thus 
becomes a true political form. Rosanvallon’s position is extremely 
inspiring in its reversal of perspective, but shall be contextualized 
and understood within the social conditions favouring mistrust, 
well analysed by Sztompka. 
Social gaps and trust gaps in social relationships and politi-
cal life need to be filled. Thus, a replacement of trust responding 
to social needs takes the stage. Giddens defined near-mistrust as 
the feeling of passive expectation and stagnation: the wait for a 
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game-changing event. It is easy to see how – during such wait for a 
salvific event – a substitute of trust comes about and consolidates: 
ghettoization, with everything it implies in terms of closure. The 
lack of general trust is compensated by that towards one’s own 
solid group, and turns into xenophobia. By cutting out the external 
world, people reduce part of the complexity and uncertainty. This 
phenomenon often results in the search for a strong figure with an 
iron hand to chase away all our existential fears and with the abil-
ity to reject all that which triggers our mistrust, those who are 
foreigners, those different to us: when such leaders emerge, they 
become the driveshaft of a blind replacement trust. 
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